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EQUAL PROTECTION AND PRISON-TO-HOSPITAL
TRANSFERS: UNITED STATES ex rel.
SCHUSTER v. HEROLD
Until recently a prisoner's "rights" were not rights at all but
exceptional privileges which "the law in its humanity accords to him." I
Today there is growing judicial recognition that "[a] prisoner retains
all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." 2 This changing view of
prisoners' rights evolved as a resolution of two competing factors. The
first is the understandable reluctance of the courts to interfere with
internal prison administration. 3 The second is the realization that certain constitutional guarantees protect even convicts ' and that a judicial
duty to define and enforce prisoners' rights is essential to these guarantees.5 Courts have proceeded slowly toward defining a middle ground
between these positions, intervening only when the infringement of
prisoners' rights reached "such a constitutional magnitude" as would
justify departure from the general rule of noninterference.' Courts have
1 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
2 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) ; see, e.g., Price v. Johnston,

334 U.S. 266 (1948) ; People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d
725, 215 N.Y.S2d 44 (1961).
For a thorough discussion of prisoners' rights, see Note, Constitutional Rights of
Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Constitutional Rights of Prisoners]. See also Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REV. 669
(1966) ; Note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights,
53 Iowa L. Rv. 671 (1967); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Beyond the Ken of the Courts].
3 Some courts have stated the dogma of the independence of prison authorities in
language which suggests courts have no jurisdiction to enforce prisoners' rights. In
Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954), for
example, the court stated that "courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regulations." This doctrine
has been primarily responsible for the lack of redress for state prisoners. To the
extent the doctrine prevents review of prisoner deprivations which are necessary concomitants of prison life, it provides a useful method of disposing of frivolous prisoner
complaints. But the proposition that courts have no jurisdiction over prisoners' complaints is untenable if it is accepted that prisoners have certain rights and that implicit
in such guarantees is a judicial duty to define and enforce those rights. See Beyond
the Ken of the Courts, supra note 2, at 506-07; Constitutional Rights of Prisoners,
supra
note 2, at 986-87.
4
See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
5
See note 3 supra. Until recently, this duty has not been fulfilled. See, e.g.,
Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961);
Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955);
United States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F2d 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348

U.S. 846 (1954).

6Although some courts have suggested that courts "will interfere if the treatment
of prisoners amounts to deprivation of [their] constitutional rights," other courts have
taken the position that not all infringements of the constitutional rights of prisoners
would justify judicial intervention. Compare United States ex rel. Yaris v.
Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), with Nichols v. McGee, 169
F. Supp. 721, 725 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 (1959). Recent Supreme
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been most ready to interfere with prison administration in situations
involving unreasonable obstruction of access to the courts, infringement
of certain first amendment freedoms, or violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment7 United States
ex rel. Schuster v. Herold," however, is among the first decisions to
apply equal protection principles to a state's differing treatment of
prisoners and nonprisoners.9 In Schuster, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a New York statute violated
the Federal Constitution because it afforded substantially fewer procedural safeguards 10 to prisoners facing transfer to an institution for
the criminally insane than to nonprisoners facing involuntary commitment." More specifically, the court ruled that a New York prisoner
Court decisions have not attempted a definitive formulation of prisoners' rights. In
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969), the Court noted:
There is no doubt that discipline and administration of state detention facilities
are state functions. They are subject to federal authorities only where paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights supervene. It is clear, however, that in instances where state regulations applicable to inmates of prison
facilities conflict with such rights, the regulations may be invalidated.
See also Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255
(1942) ; Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
7 See ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners,supra note 2, and cases cited therein.
8410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 81 (1969). New York
state courts first employed equal protection principles to test that state's refusal to
grant prisoners facing substantial deprivations of liberty the same procedural safeguards afforded civilians in People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y2d 292, 248 N.E2d 17, 300
N.Y.S2d 102 (1969).
9In Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S.
6 (1959), the court held a prisoner's allegation that segregated cells and dining
facilities denied Negro prisoners equal protection of the laws "could state no cause
of action in this Court." Id. at 724. However, Nichols is no longer the law, for in
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), the Supreme Court affirmed a district court's
order requiring Alabama to "take the necessary and appropriate steps to desegregate
immediately the . . . state penal system." 263 F. Supp. 327, 333 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
Equal protection there prohibited a state from discriminating among prisoners along
racial lines. The decision accords with what one authority has called the "substantive
development" of equal protection. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Law, 37 CALin. L. REv. 341, 361 (1949). Courts have supplemented the equal protection doctrine of unreasonable statutory classifications "with the assertion that there
are some classifications which can never be made no matter how reasonably they may
be related to a legitimate public purpose." Id. 354; see Developments in the LawEqual Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1087-1101 (1969).
IoThe court held that prisoner patients are entitled to substantially the same
safeguards afforded nonprisoners before commitment. "[O]ur decision today does not
mean that all distinctions between civilian and prisoner patients must be swept aside."
410 F2d at 1084. For example, civilians are entitled to a judicial determination not
just that they are insane, but that they are dangerously so, before they can be committed to a hospital operated by the Department of Correction. This additional
finding, the court suggests, may be inappropriate for prisoner patients who, because
they have long penal sentences still to serve, might be more prone to escape and
therefore require additional security.
11 In Matthews v. Hardy, No. 22,315 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 29, 1969) (Wright, J.),
the District of Columbia's streamlined procedure for prisoner transfers to St. Elizabeth's Hospital was found vulnerable to the same equal protection analysis as was
employed in Schuster. D.C. CODE AN. § 24-302 (1967) provided that if the Director
of Corrections believed a prisoner was mentally ill, he could refer the prisoner to a
psychiatrist; and, if the psychiatrist concurred in that belief, the Director could
transfer the prisoner to St. Elizabeth's. In order to save the statute from constitutional
attack, the court construed it to require that a prisoner be given the same rights to a
judicial hearing, jury trial, notice, appointed counsel, cross-examination, and release
procedures as was provided in the District's civil commitment statute.
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transferred to a hospital for the criminally insane was entitled to examination by two independent physicians, appropriate notice of a hearing
at which he could introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses,
judicial review of the transfer proceedings before his transfer, and
periodic reexamination by the state Mental Health Information Service
of the need for continued confinement after his transfer.'
The decision contributes significantly to the developing law of
prisoner rights in two ways. First, it assures to prisoners the availability of whatever safeguards have been instituted for nonprisoners by
the states within the Second Circuit's jurisdiction. 13 While civil commitment procedures in some states may themselves be deficient in
' their application should appreciably
affording procedural due process, 1"
reduce mistaken or punitive prisoner transfers. Second, because the
court framed the issue in terms of an unreasonable legislative classification rather than an assessment of the due process requirements of
prisoner commitment proceedings, the decision suggests that an equal
protection analysis can successfully be used to challenge other unreasonable prison deprivations which do not amount to infringements of other
constitutional guarantees. However, if Schuster is to make these contributions, the equal protection principles underlying the decision must
be placed on firmer analytic ground.
Roy Schuster was convicted of second degree murder in 1931 and
sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life. After serving ten years,
he sought the assistance of counsel in an effort to expose the allegedly
corrupt administration of the prison's education program.'- Shortly
thereafter the prison doctor 16 examined him and found that his charges
evidenced " 'the paranoid idea that members of the [prison] personnel
are against him.' " " Solely upon the certification of this doctor that
12 Coinpare N.Y. CoRREc. LAW §383 (McKinney 1968)
HYGIENE LAW §§ 72-74, 88 (McKinney Supp. 1969).

with N.Y.

MENTAL

13 For a sampling of representative civil commitment statutes, see R. RocK, M.

JACOBSON, & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL

(1968) ; Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 44 TEx. L. REv. 424, 460-66 (1966).
14 See Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due
Process," 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 28 (1960) ; Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 945 (1959) ; Comment, Analysis of
Legal and Medical Considerationsin Commnitment of the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J.
1178 (1947).
15 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4, Herold v. Schuster, 90 S. Ct. 81 (1969);
see 410 F2d at 1075.
13 There was no evidence that the prison doctor had psychiatric training, nor
was there a record of any diagnosis by the Dannemora doctor who examined Schuster
before his transfer. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4, Herold v. Schuster, 90
S. Ct. 81 (1969) (examination before transfer); 410 F.2d at 1076 (no evidence of
psychiatric training of prison doctor nor record of diagnosis by Dannemora doctor).
17410 F2d at 1073. In its brief for certiorari to the Supreme Court the state
attempted, by juxtaposing the allegations in Schuster's pro se brief to the Second
Circuit and a medical text's description of paranoia, to demonstrate that Schuster
presently suffers from this psychotic disorder. Compare Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 57a-59a, Herold v. Schuster, 90 S. Ct. 81 (1969), with id. 60a-63a.
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the prisoner was " 'in his opinion insane,' "1 Schuster was transferred
in 1941 to Dannemora State Hospital for the Criminally Insane. 9
Schuster became eligible for parole in 1948 but because the parole
board refuses to parole any prisoner from Dannemora, his case was
The prisoner repeatedly attempted to
perfunctorily dismissed.2
of habeas corpus, charging that he had
writ
a
courts
state
obtain from
without regard to the state of
measure
punitive
as
a
been transferred
unsuccessful. Undaunted,
were
attempts
These
health."'
his mental
Schuster initiated a federal habeas corpus petition and won still another
hearing. Reaching the Second Circuit on appeal from the district
court's dismissal of the writ, he contended that because he had been
denied the same procedural safeguards that New York afforded nonprisoners facing commitment to a hospital for the mentally ill, the
statute under which he had been transferred violated the equal protection clause.'
1s 410 F2d at 1075.
TD For a critical examination of Dannemora, see SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
STUDY OF CONFINEMENT PROCEDURES AND THE LAw RELATING TO INCOMPETENTS,
Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK & FORDHAM UNIV. LAW SCHOOL,
MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRImINAL DEFENDANT 23-26 (1968) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. BAR REPORT] ; Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome:
An Analysis of the Confinement of Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the
Department of Correction of the State of New York, 17 BUFF. L. REv. 651 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Morris].
In Dixon v. Attorney General, No. 69-293 (M.D. Pa., filed July 22, 1969), the
state has admitted certain facts concerning conditions at Farview State Hospital, a
Pennsylvania institution similar to Dannemora. The allegations and admissions are
thought to be the first court record establishing the conditions of such institutional life.
Farview has over 1,100 inmates, but is staffed by only 31 professionals, including 1
psychiatrist-who does not himself treat inmates-and 5 physicians. Farview has 400
"psychiarty security aids" who function primarily as guards. No more than 2 or 3%
of the inmates at Farview are psychotherapeutically treated; the rest of the inmates
receive mainly custodial care. Farview is so situated that it is difficult for the families
of inmates to visit a relative at Farview. Complaint at 25-27, Answer at 2, Dixon
v. Attorney General, No. 69-293 (M.D. Pa., filed July 22, 1969).
For a discussion of the antitherapeutic value of commitment to Farview, see
Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Criminals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 78 (1961) ; Comment, Commitment to Farview: Incompetency
to Stand Trial in Pennsylvania, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1164 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Commitment to Farview].
20

While, theoretically, the Parole Board has authority to parole Schuster
directly from Dannemora, 1944 Op. Atty. Gen. 117, in practice the Board
does not parole anyone who is incarcerated in a mental institution for the presumption is that he is mentally ill.
410 F2d at 1076 n.3.
Although there is no available evidence to indicate that parole boards in other
states systematically refuse to parole hospitalized prisoners, Matthews v. Hardy, No.
22,315 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 1969), suggests this is the practice in the District of
Columbia. Judge Wright noted that the District was "unable to assure [the court]
that inmates . . . would be called for parole hearings and considered for release on
parole." Id. at 6-7 (footnote omitted).
21410 F2d at 1076-77.
22 Brief for Appellant at 3-15, United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F2d
1071 (1969).
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A. Judicial Review of Prison-to-HospitalTransfers
If a prisoner is not harmed by transfer to a mental hospital, it is

axiomatic that he cannot maintain a suit complaining that the transfer
was unlawful.

But even if the prisoner can prove he is harmed, his

transfer will not be judicially reviewed unless the harm sustained is
sufficient to overcome a court's reluctance to enter an area which has

generally been thought to be the province of administrative remedies.
In Schuster, the Second Circuit found that the consequences of the

prison-to-hospital transfer justified judicial intervention.
To be sure, judicial review should not have been a complete
surprise. Although courts traditionally have considered transfer from
one prison to another,"5 or from a prison to a mental hospital,' to be

an administrative matter immune from judicial review, in People
ex rel. Brown v. Johnston,25 the New York Court of Appeals reversed
the action of a lower court which dismissed a habeas corpus petition
requesting review of a prisoner's transfer from a state prison to
Dannemora Hospital. The opinion stated that "any further restraint
in excess of that permitted by the judgment or constitutional guarantees
should be subject to inquiry," 28 and that habeas corpus was available
to determine whether any of the prisoner's rights had been violated.

However, Brown did not rule that the transfer from prison to a mental
hospital was in fact a "further restraint," but only that a petition for
habeas corpus which alleged further deprivation entitled the petitioner

to a judicial hearing on the question of "further restraint."

27

There

is no reported decision on remand."8 Thus Schuster is the first decision
to hold that hospitalization did in fact result in greater deprivation

than imprisonment.
There is very little empirical evidence by which a court can compare life in a mental hospital with life in a prison.' The Schuster court
cited the pro se brief of a convict at a Massachusetts mental hospital

for the criminally insane, which compared restraints and rules at the
23 See, e.g., Kingen v. Kelley, 3 Wyo. 566, 28 P. 36 (1891) ; cf. Annot., 95 A.L.R.
1455 (1934).
24
See Darey v. Sandritter, 355 F2d 22 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Urban v. Settle, 298 F.2d
592 (8th Cir. 1962); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F2d 276 (8th Cir. 1951); Rosheisen v.
Steele, 193 F2d 273 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Jones v. Pescor, 169 F2d 853 (8th Cir. 1948) ;
United States ex rel. Gapinski v. Ragen, 152 F2d 268 (7th Cir. 1945) ; People ex rel.
Sacconanno v. Shaw, 4 App. Div. 2d 817, 164 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1957) (apparently overruled by People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215
N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961)).
25 9 N.Y2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S2d 44 (1961).
2 1d. at 485, 174 N.E2d at 726, 215 N.Y.S2d at 45.
27 Cf. People ex rel. Cirrone v. Hoffman, 255 App. Div. 404, 8 N.Y.S2d 83 (1938).
28
Two years after People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, Brown attempted to vacate
his rape conviction. The opinion does not state whether Brown was in prison or a
hospital. People v. Brown, 19 App. Div. 2d 796, 242 N.Y.S2d 930 (1963).
29 There was evidence, however, that visitation and correspondence rights at
Dannemora were more restrictive than at Clinton State Prison. 410 F2d at 1080.
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Massachusetts hospital to those at a Massachusetts prison.30 But since
the court had no evidence to demonstrate the similarity of the Massachusetts and New York institutions, the brief had little formal evidentiary value. Nevertheless, the court did have some evidence concerning conditions at Dannemora,3 1 and presumed to know something
of conditions at New York state prisons. Although one authority has
stated that "[1] ife in many [prisons] is at best barren and futile, at worst
unspeakably brutal and degrading," 32 nevertheless the court had sufficient evidence to conclude that the conditions at Dannemora were worse
than at New York prisons.
Moreover, there was the "terrifying possibility that the transferred
prisoner [might] not be mentally ill at all." " The court stated:
Confined with those who are insane, told repeatedly that he
too is insane and indeed treated as insane, it does not take too
much for a man to question his own sanity and in the end
to succumb to some mental aberration. 4
The prospect of incurring in a mental hospital a disease the facility is
intended to cure is sufficiently alarming to help support a proposition
that conditions in a mental hospital are worse than those in a prison.
Procedural safeguards could assuage such fears by preventing many
mistaken or punitive transfers, but Schuster had been given "no meaningful hearing on the issue of his sanity." 35
Perhaps the most tragic consequence of Schuster's transfer was
that he thereby became ineligible for parole.36 Had he been eligible,
Schuster could conceivably have been released twenty-two years prior
to the instant decision. The court, however, only alluded to the loss
of parole eligibility; it emphasized instead the other injurious effects of
the transfer.17 The court may not have focused on this problem because parole is generally considered a matter of legislative grace avail30 410 F2d at 1080, 1090-91.
31
See N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 19; Morris, supra note 19; Dennison v. State,

49 Misc. 2d 533, 267 N.Y.S2d 920 (Ct. Cl. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 28 App.
Div. 2d 608, 280 N.Y.S2d 31 (1967), aff'd 23 N.Y2d 996, 246 N.E2d 760, 298
N.Y.S2d
1002 (1969).
3
2 THE PRESIOENT's CommissIos o LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 159 (1967).
-1410 F.2d at 1078.
34 Id.at 1078.
35 Id. at 1073.
S 6 See note 20 supra.
Moreover, there was evidence that once a patient has remained in a mental hos-

pital for two years or more, he is unlikely to leave except by death. Bloomberg, A
Proposalfor a Community-based Hospital as a Branch of a State Hospital, in J. KATz,
J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHo-ANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 664
(1967) ; see Commitment to Farview, supra note 19, at 1167.
37 410 F2d at 1080. While the court only alludes to the loss of parole eligibility
in stating the grounds of its decision, it emphasized this factor in discussing the factual
background of the case. See id. at 1074-75, 1076.
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able only at the discretion of a state's custodial officials.3 But the court
need not have relegated parole considerations to a secondary position;
it should be enough to say that a rule allowing wide parole board discretion is irrelevant when the administrative act complained of is not
the decision whether or not to grant parole. The injury to Schuster
was not that he was denied parole, but that he could not even be considered for parole because of the challenged transfer.3
The Second Circuit, then, justifiably concluded that the prison-tohospital transfer could not be left to administrative discretion, because it
significantly increased the restraints upon [Schuster], exposed
him to extraordinary hardships, and caused him to suffer
indignities, frustrations and dangers, both physical and
psychological, 4he
would not be required to endure in a typical
0
prison setting.
B. Equal Protection
1. Baxstrom v. Herold
The possible consequences of an erroneous commitment 4 pointed
up the need for procedural safeguards for prisoners being transferred to
38

See, e.g., Dimarco v. Greene, 385 F2d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 1967) ; Curtis v. Bennet, 351 F.2d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Carson v. Executive Dir., 292 F.2d 468, 469
(10th Cir. 1961); Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y2d 21, 246
N.E2d 512, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969). But see United States ex tel. Campbell v. Pate,
401 F2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968), which held that the relevant facts used to determine parole
denial must not be so "capriciously or unreliably" determined that the inmate is deprived of equal protection of the laws.
Certainly there must be some limitations, since no one would suggest that a
parole board could deny parole on the basis of an arbitrary factor such as race, without
violating the Constitution. But see note 9 supra. The problem, of course, is proving
discrimination. See Richardson v. Rivers, 335 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1964), in which
racial discrimination was alleged, but a summary judgment was granted because the
"conclusory assertions" did not provide a genuine issue concerning any material fact.
Accord, Peterson v. Rivers, 350 F2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
89 "Respondent [Schuster] does not contend, as petitioner claims, that he had a
right to be paroled. He contends, merely, that he had a right not to be excluded from
the class of persons who are so considered." Respondent's Brief in Opposition to
Certiorari at 11, Herold v. Schuster, 90 S.Ct. 81 (1969).
However, this distinction between parole denial and eligibility for parole has not
been articulated by the courts, and its judicial acceptability remains in doubt. Compare
Carson v. Executive Dir., 292 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1961), with United States ex iel.
Campbell v. Pate, 401 F2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968).
40410 F.2d at 1078. Another consequence of the transfer mentioned by the
court is that under New York law Schuster could not seek to vacate his original conviction by a writ of coram nobis while he remained at Dannemora. There is no evidence, however, that Schuster ever sought to do so. 410 F2d at 1080 (citing People v.
Booth, 17 N.Y2d 681, 216 N.E2d 615, 269 N.Y.S2d 457 (1966)).
In Matthews v. Hardy, No. 22,315 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 1969) the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia emphasized a factor which the Schuster court did not
consider: "[A]lthough regrettable, it is a fact that there is a stigma attached to the
mentally ill which is different from that attached to the criminal class in general."
Id. at 6. The social position of prisoner-patients, both in the prison community to
which they may have to return and in society at large which they must face on release,
may be seriously impaired by the label "insane." Although a life prisoner who is
ineligible for parole will never have to face society at large, he may be stigmatized by
his fellow convicts if he ever returns to prison.
41 Because the procedural safeguards Schuster demanded were designed to prevent
mistaken commitment of sane prisoners, the court emphasized throughout its discussion
the harm that could be done to a sane individual who is confined with the insane.
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mental hospitals. Thus the court might have based its decision on the
grounds that there was deprivation of liberty without due process of
law. However, such a rationale would have presented considerably
more difficult problems.'
The court focused instead on the disparity
of treatment between prisoners and nonprisoners. At the time of
Schuster's commitment, a prisoner could be transferred to Dannemora
on the certification of a single doctor, without a hearing or judicial
review.4 3 Commitment of a civilian, however, required the examination
of two qualified examiners, notice of commitment proceedings, and a
hearing which allowed an opportunity to cross-examine and present
evidence. 44 Relying on Baxstrom v. Herold,45 the court held that this
disparity deprived Schuster of the equal protection of the laws.4
While the result in Schuster is consistent with Baxstrom, it does
not follow as a matter of course. In Baxstrom, the state attempted to
Cf. Dennison v. State, 49 Misc. 2d 533, 537, 267 N.Y.S.2d 920, 924 (Ct. CI. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 28 App. Div. 2d 608, 280 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1967), aft'd, 23 N.Y.2d
996, 246 N.E2d 760, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1969) :
The conclusion is inescapable that, although the claimant did become
psychotic after several years at [an institution for defective delinquents],
the psychosis or the appearance of psychotic symptoms was caused by the
nature of his confinement.
42 Not only are the limits of the due process clause difficult to define, but there
is a considerable body of precedent rejecting due process challenges to prison-tohospital transfers. See cases cited note 24 mipra. But cf. Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605 (1967).
One should note that Schuster unsuccessfully contended in the state courts that
his transfer lacked procedural due process; because Baxstrom had yet to be decided,
there was no precedent for an equal protection challenge. See People ex rel. Schuster
v. Herold, 15 N.Y2d 968, 969, 207 N.E2d 527, 527, 259 N.Y.S,2d 856, 856 (1965).
43 410 F.2d at 1080. The statute pursuant to which Schuster was transferred,
ch. 32, art. 5, [1909] Consol. Laws of New York 1757-65 (repealed 1965), was replaced
by N.Y. CoaaEc. LAW § 383 (McKinney 1968).
44 410 F2d at 1080. The civilian commitment statute at the time of Schuster's
transfer, ch. 395, §§ 72-75, [1933] Consol. Laws of New York 931-35 (repealed 1965),
was replaced by N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 72-74, 88 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
45383 U.S. 107 (1966), noted in 12 Vn.i. L. Rnv. 178 (1966); see Comment,
Equal Protection and the Commitment of the Insane in Wisconsin, 50 MARQ. L. REv.
120 46
(1966).
The court held that the disparity between the procedural safeguards afforded
prisoners and nonprisoners at the time of Schuster's transfer violated equal protection principles. It went on to order that Schuster be given a hearing to determine
whether he should be detained at Dannemora or Clinton State Prison. At this hearing,
the Second Circuit required that Schuster be given "substantially the same procedural
safeguards" as currently employed in civil commitments. Not only did the Second
Circuit rule that the disparity which existed in 1941 between procedural safeguards
afforded prisoners and nonprisoners was constitutionally impermissible, it also ruled
that the current disparity violated equal protection. 410 F2d at 1083-84. Compare
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAWS §§ 72-74, 88 (McKinney Supp. 1969) with N.Y. CoRREc.
LAW §383 (McKinney 1968). The court further noted that "[a]lthough the State
argued that the prisoner commitment procedures in the federal system are analogous
to New York Correction Law § 383, the validity of those federal procedures is not
before us now." 410 F2d at 1078 n.5. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1964).
The Second Circuit did not decide whether Schuster could constitutionally be
hospitalized absent adequate treatment. However, citing, inter alia, Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State
Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E2d 908 (1968), the court suggested that it might
recognize a constitutional right to treatment-grounded in either the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment of the eighth amendment or the due process or equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment-if the proper case were before it.
410 F2d at 1087-89.
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confine a prisoner at Dannemora after the expiration of his penal sentence.47 The procedural safeguards afforded those allegedly insane upon
expiration of a prison term were similar to those used in civil commitments except that civilians alleged to be insane had the right to a
de novo review by jury trial of the question of sanity. The Supreme
Court reasoned that the interests of prisoners nearing the end of their
prison term were identical to the interests of nonprisoners, for the
statutory purpose of preventing erroneous commitments. The Court
found that the state's distinction between soon-to-be-released prisoners
and civilians was an unreasonable legislative classification, because it
treated differently those similarly situated with respect to the purpose
of the law. Chief Justice Warren stated for the Court:
Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with
identically, but it does require that a distinction made have
some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is
made.

.

.

. Classification of mentally ill persons as either

insane or dangerously insane of course may be a reasonable
distinction for purposes of determining the type of custodial
or medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever
in the context of the opportunity to show whether a person
is mentally ill at all. For purposes of granting judicial review
before a jury of the question whether a person is mentally ill
and in need of institutionalization, there is no conceivable
basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is
nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments.4"
The Second Circuit found the Baxstrom rationale broad enough
to cover the facts in Schuster. In the court's words:
Baxstrom clearly instructs that the procedures to be followed
in determining whether one is committable must be unaffected
by the irrelevant circumstance that one is or has recently
47
Johnnie Baxstrom was certified to be insane by a prison doctor while serving
a three year penal sentence and was transferred to Dannemora. Pursuant to New
York law as it then stood, the Director at Dannemora petitioned the county court,
requesting that Baxstrom be civilly committed at the expiration of his penal sentence.
Civil commitment of prisoners at the expiration of a penal sentence differed from all
other civil commitments. All persons dissatisfied with a civil commitment order could
demand a full review by a jury of the determination of their mental illness-all, that is,
except those committed at the end of a penal term, who were denied this right.
Moreover, a civilian could be committed to hospitals maintained by the Department of
Correction only after a judicial finding that the individual was so dangerous that he
should not be confined in a civil hospital. But the decision to confine persons civilly
committed at the expiration of their penal sentences at a hospital for the dangerously
insane or a civil hospital was completely in the hands of administrative officials. The
Court held that equal protection demanded that Baxstrom receive the same treatment
as those civilly committed.
For the impact of the Baxstrom decision on prisoners' rights, see Morris, supra
note 19, at 670-75.
48 383 U.S. at 111-12 (citation omitted).
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been under sentence pursuant to a criminal conviction, although the fact that one has committed a crime may be rele-

vant to the substantive conclusion that he is mentally ill.4 9

However, the court did not deal with the Supreme Court's emphasis on
the fact that Baxstrom was nearing the end of his sentence and thus
had his sentence extended indefinitely when he was committed. Baxstrom, the Second Circuit said, teaches that "[w]hether a man should
be committed for mental illness has no relevance to the place where he
happens to be at the time he becomes ill." 60 While there is broad language in the Bazstrom opinion which can support such a statement, 51
the Second Circuit's conclusion does not follow without further discussion. Baxstrom holds only that a state may not differentiate in its
procedural safeguards between a prisoner nearing the expiration of his
penal sentence and all other persons civilly committed. In Schuster,
the legislative classification operated to distinguish a prisoner under a
life sentence from civilians.
To support its expansive interpretation of Baxstrom, the court
cited other cases which extended the Baxstrom rationale to related
The court found indistinguishable People v.
factual situations.'
Fuller,5 3 in which the New York Court of Appeals used Baxstrom
to hold that convicts alleged to be narcotics addicts could not be required
to undergo a special rehabilitation program-involving the possibility
of extended sentences-unless they were given a jury trial on the
issue of their addiction, as provided for nonprisoners alleged to be
addicted. But Fuller dealt with a commitment which could have extended the period of incarceration, and was therefore more like Baxstrom
than Schuster. The Fuller court stated that:
[I]f the substantive crime committed is a misdemeanor, the
State has the right to deprive the defendant of his freedom
for a period of only one year, not three years. After one year
49 410 F2d at 1081.
Zo

Id. at 1083-84.

51 See, e.g., 383 U.S. at 111:
[T]he State, having made this substantial review proceeding generally available on [the question of sanity], may not, consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arbitrarily withhold it from some.
62 Bolton v. Harris, 395 F2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Cameron v. Mullen,
387 F2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ; and People v. Lally, 19 N.Y2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277
N.Y.S2d 654 (1966), extended Baxstrom to those found not guilty by reason of
insanity.
People ex re. Goldfinger v. Johnston, 53 Misc. 2d 949, 280 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup.
Ct. 1967), held that a youth could not be transferred from a correctional school to an
institution for defective delinquents without the safeguards afforded civilians.
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), held that a convicted sex offender
was entitled to a further hearing before he could be sentenced to an indefinite term
as dangerous or an "habitual offender and mentally ill". Although Speclt referred
to Baxstrom, the basis of decision was the due process clause and not the equal protection clause as in Baxsfrom.
5324 N.Y2d 292, 248 N.E2d 17, 300 N.Y.S2d 102 (1969).
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he would be entitled to regain his freedom. The justification
for the loss of liberty for periods beyond the maximum authorized sentence for the crime must, therefore, rest on some
other basis-the program's civil or nonpunitive aspect. The
commitment, therefore, does not differ from purely civil
commitment proceedings in nature,
purpose and effect, and
4
the right to jury must obtain.
The issue presented in Schuster-whether an individual who is already
incarcerated for life suffers a further deprivation when he is committed-was not decided.
2. A Suggested Rationale
Perhaps to avoid the appearance of fashioning new law, the
Schuster court based its decision solely on Baxstrorn and later cases
which adopted Baxstrom's rationale. Although Schuster discussed
some of the relevant policy considerations, the court did not attempt a
thorough analysis of equal protection principles as applied to the
Schuster facts. If Schuster is to be persuasive to courts in other jurisdictions, this analysis must be supplied.
The standard used to determine whether state legislative classifications violate the equal protection clause may vary with the particular
challenged classification.5 5 According to a common formulation, a
classification is constitutionally permissible only if it rests "upon some
difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect
to which the classification is proposed .

.

.

."

"

But however the

constitutional standard is stated, "the end result is whether the line
drawn is a rational one." 57 Thus in Schuster the issue was whether
the line drawn between prisoner and civilian was rational for the purpose of commitment.
54 Id.

at 305, 248 N.E.2d at 22-23, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 109.

55See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, supra note 9, at

353; Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny,
16 STAN. L. Rzv. 394, 399 (1964).
5
6 Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
In addition, classifications must serve some legitimate state purpose. See, e.g.,
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) ; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
supra note 9, at 1081. The legitimacy of the state's purpose-to determine which of
those allegedly insane prisoners is in fact mentally ill and in need of hospitalizationwas, of course, not questioned.
57 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
In general, legislative classifications must bear some reasonable relationship to
the statutory purpose. But where the rights in question are so fundamental that the
state must prove a "compelling state interest" to justify any interference with those
rights, "the issue is not whether the legislative judgments are rational. A more
exacting standard obtains." Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621,
633 (1969). This Comment does not discuss whether a special equal protection
standard might apply to the Schuster situation, since even under the traditional test
Schuster was denied equal protection.
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Two reasons can be suggested to justify the statutory distinction.
The first is that criminals are more likely to be insane than noncriminals, and, therefore, less stringent precautions need be taken when
deciding whether to commit them."8 As Schuster recognized, crimes,
as abnormal acts, may be relevant to the substantive conclusion that a
prisoner is mentally ill.5" However, even if criminals as a class are
more likely to be insane than civilians-a proposition neither logically
compelled nor empirically verified 6o-the average criminal and the
average civilian are not the individuals to whom the differing commitment procedures are applied. Rather, commitment procedures apply to
those persons within these larger classifications who have exhibited
abnormal behavior and are alleged to be insane. When a civilian and a
prisoner, both of whom have exhibited abnormal behavior, are compared, it is considerably more speculative, if not wholly inaccurate, to say
that the prisoner is more likely to be insane than the nonprisoner.
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the allegedly insane criminal
is more likely to be insane than his civilian counterpart, this higher
58

See Mathews v. Hardy, No. 22,315, at 5 n.11 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 1969).
This argument is perhaps also suggested by the state's contention in Baxstrom:
[The state] argues that it is reasonable to classify persons in Baxstrom's
class together with those found to be dangerously insane since such persons
are not only insane but have proven criminal tendencies as shown by their
past criminal records.
383 U.S. at 114. The Supreme Court rejected this contention as "untenable." Id.
The Court stated:
Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously insane
of course may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining the
type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever
in the context of the opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at
all. [For this purpose] . . . there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing
the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all
other civil commitments.
Id. at 111-12. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that
[a] person with a past criminal record is presently entitled to a hearing on
the question whether he is dangerously mentally ill so long as he is not in
prison at the time civil commitment proceedings are instituted. Given this
distinction, all semblance of rationality of the classification, purportedly based
on criminal propensities, disappears.
Id. at 115.
59 "[T]he fact that one has committed a crime may be relevant to the substantive
conclusion that he is mentally ill." 410 F2d at 1081.
60

Unless we can say with assurance that commission of a crime is a highly
reliable indicator of mental illness, prior criminal conduct cannot justify
aborting the full judicial inquiry into the question of mental illness. Since we
have not been referred to any authority which indicates such a close nexus
between criminal conduct and mental illness, and since there is no indication
that Congress made such a determination when it enacted [the challenged
statute], we think that to distinguish between criminals and non-criminals,
denying to the former the very important safeguards which insure a full and
fair hearing on the issue of mental illness would be arbitrary.
Matthews v. Hardy, No. 22,315, at 5-6 n.11 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 1969).
Insanity only seldom manifests itself in criminal conduct. It is estimated that 18
million people in the United States are suffering from some form of mental illnessabout one in every 10 persons. N.Y. DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE, HOSPITALIZATION
FOR MENTAL ILLNESS IN NEw YORK STATE (1965) (pamphlet).
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probability should not be the basis for treating differently the prisoner
and the nonprisoner. It may be true that if slightly less stringent
procedures were used to determine the sanity of prisoners, the percentage of incorrect judgments would be substantially the same as in the
case of nonprisoners. However, not only is it impossible to determine
how much the procedures could differ and still result in the same
number of mistaken commitments, but this type of callous "mistake
equalization" is an unacceptable rationale for establishing procedures by
which individuals are adjudged insane and hospitalized for long periods
of time. Rather than building mistakes into the system, a court should
not be satisfied if the percentage of mistaken commitments is the same for
both prisoners and nonprisoners; it should require instead that an equal
effort be made, by the best procedures available, to protect both prisoners and nonprisoners against erroneous determinations of insanity.6
In other words, the equal protection clause requires that an equal effort
be made to eliminate mistaken commitments-not that an equal number
of mistakes be made.
A second reason has been proposed for differing insanity-determination procedures. In its brief for certiorari to the Supreme Court
requesting review of Schuster, the state argued that "[i]t is in no sense
arbitrary to differentiate between those whose detention results from a
valid criminal conviction, and someone whose life is interrupted solely
by virtue of a determination that he is mentally ill .

,,62 More

.

directly, the state's argument was that incarceration in a mental hospital is not as great a hardship for a prisoner who would otherwise be
imprisoned as is mistaken hospitalization for a nonprisoner who would
otherwise be free.'3 Therefore, fewer safeguards are needed to protect
prisoners from error than are needed to protect nonprisoners. This
contention is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, if the prisoner loses
the possibility of parole, he may have as many years of liberty at stake
in an insanity determination as does the noncriminal. Second, the argument above applies here with equal force-an equal effort should be
made to protect both prisoners and nonprisoners against erroneous
determinations of insanity, using the best procedures available.
Neither of the arguments above provides a "reasonable and just"
rationale for employing less stringent procedural safeguards in prisoner
61 Cf. Matthews v. Hardy, No. 22,315, at 5 n.11 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 1969):

The point here is simply that the judicial procedures in the [civil commitment
statute] were designed to afford the fullest possible ventilation of the question
whether a person is mentally ill.
62Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 18-19, Herold v. Schuster, 90 S. Ct. 81

(1969).
63

As to persons generally, Congress has erected

. . .

a full system of procedural

safeguards [to determine the propriety of their commitment] .

.

.

. The

appropriate question here is whether incarceration in a mental hospital is
sufficiently different from incarceration in a prison to require the same or
similar safeguards.
Matthews v. Hardy, No. 22,315, at 6 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 1969).
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commitment proceedings than in civil involuntary commitments, nor
can more persuasive arguments be found. Thus, because the line drawn
between prisoners and nonprisoners is unreasonable, prisoners are denied
the equal protection of the law.
CONCLUSION

Schuster will have its most immediate impact on commitment procedures for prisoners in New York. Exactly how much it will affect
transfer procedures in other jurisdictions will depend on the procedural
safeguards afforded by civil commitment statutes in those states in
which Schuster is followed.
But more important than this immediate impact is the equal protection analysis Schuster contributes to the developing law of prisoners'
rights. If, as Schuster holds, criminality is not a constitutionally permissible distinction for the purpose of defining procedures to determine
sanity, many unreasonable prisoner deprivations, hitherto unassailable,
may also be vulnerable to an equal protection challenge.

